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PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING AND 
IMPLEMENTING AN “EFFECTIVELY  
WORKING PLAN” AS REQUIRED BY  
OLMSTEAD V. L.C. EX REL 
INTRODUCTION 
Hailed as “the Brown v. Board of Education for Disability 
Rights,”1 the United States Supreme Court declared in Olmstead v. 
L.C. ex rel Zimring that the institutionalization of people with 
disabilities who are capable and desirous of receiving treatment in the 
community is a form of unlawful discrimination.2 The case originated 
in Georgia when two women with mental illnesses, who resided in 
the psychiatric unit of a state hospital, sued the Georgia Department 
of Human Resources for failing to place them in community-based 
treatment programs for which they qualified.3 This unnecessary 
institutionalization, the women claimed, was a form of unlawful 
discrimination and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.4 The 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that once a disabled person qualifies 
for community-based treatment, it is unlawful for the State to confine 
them to an institution.5 The Court acknowledged that under the ADA, 
states do not have to make modifications that would result in a 
“fundamental alteration” of their programs or services.6 The Court 
said that a state could meet the reasonable modification standard by 
showing that it has “a comprehensive, effectively working plan for 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Mary C. Cerreto, Olmstead: The Brown v. Board of Education for Disability Rights: Promises, 
Limits, and Issues, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 47, 47 (2001); Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 653, 654 (2000). 
 2. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). 
 3. Id. at 593–94. 
 4. Id. at 594. The ADA requires that states (1) make “reasonable modifications” to their programs 
in order to avoid disability-based discrimination and (2) provide services to people with disabilities “in 
the most integrated setting appropriate.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), (d) (2008). 
 5. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998)). See infra Part I for a 
discussion of the Olmstead decision. 
 6. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998)). 
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placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive 
settings, and a waiting list that moves at a reasonable pace.”7  
Prompted by the Olmstead decision, states began developing 
“Olmstead Plans” for moving individuals out of institutions and 
providing services to people with disabilities in community settings.8 
Although the Supreme Court left open the questions of what 
constitutes an “‘effectively working plan’” or a waiting list that 
moves at a “‘reasonable pace,’”9 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
and Third Circuit Court of Appeals have addressed these questions.10  
Applying the two approaches of the circuit courts, this Note will 
assess Georgia’s progress in developing and implementing an 
effectively working plan. Part I provides, as background, an overview 
of the Olmstead decision.11 Part II discusses the Ninth and Third 
Circuit approaches to evaluating an effectively working plan.12 Part 
III discusses Georgia’s progress in developing and implementing its 
own plan and assesses whether Georgia has an effectively working 
plan as defined by the circuit courts.13 Ultimately, this Note 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. at 605–06. Although the Olmstead decision “concerned adults with mental illness,” it applies 
to all people who are disabled and either currently institutionalized or at risk for institutionalization. Sara 
Rosenbaum, The Olmstead Decision: Implications for State Health Policy, 19 HEALTH AFF. 228, 230 
(2000) (“Olmstead concerned adults with mental illness. However, it is clear that the case applies to 
persons of all ages with both physical and mental disabilities.”); Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, 
Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to 
State Medicaid Director (Jan. 14, 2000), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SMDL/SMD/list.asp 
[hereinafter HCFA Letter 1] (“This decision confirms what this Administration already believes: that no 
one should have to live in an institution or a nursing home if they can live in the community with the 
right support    . . . . Although Olmstead involved two individuals with mental disabilities, the scope of 
the ADA is not limited only to such individuals . . . . In addition, the requirement to provide services in 
the most integrated setting appropriate applies not only to persons already in institutional settings but to 
those being assessed for possible institutionalization.”). 
 8. See MARTIN KITCHENER ET AL., UCSF NATIONAL CENTER FOR PERSONAL ASSISTANCE 
SERVICES, HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES: INTRODUCTION TO OLMSTEAD LAWSUITS AND 
OLMSTEAD PLANS, Table 1 (4th rev. 2006), available at http://pascenter.org/olmstead/index.php 
(showing that twenty-nine states had Olmstead Plans in 2006). 
 9. Cerreto, supra note 1, at 69 (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605–06). 
 10. See Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005); Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. 
Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 620–22 (9th Cir. 2005); Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 422 F.3d 151, 
156 (3d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Frederick III]; see also infra Part II for an in-depth discussion of these 
decisions. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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concludes that Georgia has failed to implement an effectively 
working plan under the Third Circuit’s approach, though its plan may 
satisfy the Ninth Circuit.14 If the state wants to continue complying 
with the Ninth Circuit’s requirements, it cannot allow funding 
shortages to impede its future progress in moving people out of 
institutions, expanding its HCBS waiver programs, and increasing 
spending on community-based services.15 
I.   BACKGROUND: OLMSTEAD V. L.C. EX REL ZIMRING 
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)16 in 
1990 to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities.17 
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people with 
disabilities18 by public entities in their services, programs, or 
activities.19 Regulations promulgated pursuant to Title II of the 
ADA20 require that public entities “administer services, programs, 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000). In the preamble to the Act, Congress recognized that, among other 
things: (1) millions of Americans have disabilities and the number of people with disabilities is growing 
as people age; (2) society has historically isolated and segregated people with disabilities and this 
“continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem;” (3) discrimination continues in many 
“critical areas,” including “access to public services” and institutionalization; and (4) “the Nation’s 
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”  Id. § 12101(a).  
 18. Id. § 12101(b). According to the ADA, an individual has a “disability” if that person has “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [the individual’s] major life 
activities.” Id. § 12102(2)(A). The definition of disability also includes individuals who have “a record 
of such an impairment” or are “regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(2)(B)–(C). 
 19. Id. § 12132 (“No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). A person is a “qualified individual 
with a disability” if she “meets the essential eligibility requirements” to receive the services or 
participate in the programs of the public entity. Id. § 12131(2). A “public entity” for purposes of the 
ADA includes state and local governments as well as departments, agencies, and other divisions thereof. 
Id. § 12131(1). 
 20. The Attorney General was responsible for promulgating the regulations to implement Title II of 
the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 591 (1999). As required by 
Title II of the ADA, the Attorney General’s regulations are consistent with regulations promulgated 
under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 591 (“The Attorney General’s regulations, 
Congress further directed, ‘shall be consistent with this chapter and with the coordination regulations . . . 
applicable to recipients of Federal financial assistance under [§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act].’”). 
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and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs 
of qualified individuals with disabilities.”21 Furthermore, the 
regulations require that public entities “make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability.”22 A public entity may only avoid making such 
modifications if it “can demonstrate that making the modifications 
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 
activity.” 23  
In 1995, L.C. and E.W., two women diagnosed with mental 
retardation and mental illnesses,24 brought claims against the State of 
                                                                                                                 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits handicap-based discrimination in “any program or 
activity that receives or benefits from federal financial assistance.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(a) (2008). 
Furthermore, Section 504 requires that recipients of federal financial assistance “administer programs 
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped persons.” 
Id. § 41.51(d). The Attorney General, in the preamble to the Title II regulations, defined “‘the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities’ to mean ‘a setting 
that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent 
possible.’” Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, p. 450 (1998)). 
 21. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2008). The Attorney General’s regulations incorporated Congress’ 
definition of disability from Title II: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as 
having such an impairment.” Id. § 35.104. But, the Attorney General parsed the definition of disability 
even further. Under the regulations, “physical or mental impairment” includes “(A) Any physiological 
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following 
body systems: Neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech 
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and 
endocrine; (B) Any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” Id. Additionally, “[t]he phrase 
physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, such contagious and noncontagious 
diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, 
muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional 
illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, 
drug addiction, and alcoholism.” Id. The phrase “major life activities,” for the purposes of the 
Attorney’s General’s regulations, “means functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Id. 
 22. Id. § 35.130(b)(7). 
 23. Id. When a state claims that it cannot make accommodations for persons with disabilities because 
doing so would result in a fundamental alteration of its programs or services, the state has asserted a 
“fundamental alteration defense.”  See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 594–95, 597, 605 (1999) 
(where the Court uses term “fundamental-alteration defense”). 
 24. L.C. was diagnosed with schizophrenia and E.W. with personality disorder. Olmstead, 527 U.S. 
at 593. 
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Georgia under Title II of the ADA.25 The two women had “a history 
of treatment in institutional settings.”26 L.C. was “voluntarily 
admitted to Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta (GRH)” in May 
1992 and “confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit.”27 A year 
later, her doctors at GRH determined that “her needs could be met 
appropriately in one of the community-based programs the State 
supported.”28 Despite her doctors’ recommendations, L.C. remained 
institutionalized at GRH.29 Similarly, E.W. was “voluntarily admitted 
to GRH in February [of] 1995” and “confined for treatment in a 
psychiatric unit.”30 Although her doctors said that “she could be 
treated appropriately in a community-based setting,” E.W. remained 
institutionalized at GRH.31 The women claimed that “the State’s 
failure to place [them] in a community-based program, once [their] 
treating professionals determined that such placement was 
appropriate, violated, inter alia, Title II of the ADA.”32  
The State argued that inadequate funding, not discrimination on the 
basis of disability, accounted for the continued [institutionalization] 
of the two women.33 The State also argued that “requiring immediate 
transfers in cases of this order would ‘fundamentally alter’ the State’s 
activity” because the State was “already using all available funds to 
provide services to other persons with disabilities.”34 However, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected the 
State’s cost-based defense and fundamental alteration defense and 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the two women.35  
                                                                                                                 
 25. The Commissioner of the Department of Human Resources, the Superintendent of Georgia 
Regional Hospital, and the Executive Director of the Fulton County Regional Board (collectively, the 
State) were named as defendants. Id. at 593–94. 
 26. Id. at 593. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. L.C. was placed in a community-based treatment program in February 1996, nine months after 
filing suit against the State. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593. 
 30. Id. 
 31. E.W. remained institutionalized at GRH until a few months after the District Court’s judgment in 
this case in 1997. Id. 
 32. Id. at 594. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 594–95. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s judgment, but remanded the case for an assessment of 
“whether the additional expenditures necessary to treat L.C. and E.W. 
in community-based care would be unreasonable given the demands 
of the State’s mental health budget.”36 The Eleventh Circuit made it 
clear, however, that the State’s cost justification would fail if the 
State did not prove that requiring it to expend additional funds in 
order to provide L.C. and E.W. with integrated services “‘would be 
so unreasonable given the demands of the State’s mental health 
budget that it would fundamentally alter the service [the State] 
provides.’”37  
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari38 to decide “whether 
the proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons 
with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in 
institutions.”39 First, the Supreme Court outlined the key provisions 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the regulations 
promulgated under the Act.40 Next, the Court acknowledged that the 
Attorney General and the Department of Justice had already 
determined that unjustified institutionalization is a form of 
discrimination prohibited by Title II of the ADA.41 The Court also 
recognized that “Congress explicitly identified unjustified 
‘segregation’ of person with disabilities as a ‘form of 
discrimination.’”42 The Court then addressed two policy reasons for 
providing disability services in community-based settings rather than 
in institutions.43 The continued institutionalization of people “who 
can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates 
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or 
unworthy of participating in community life.”44 Additionally, 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 595–96. 
 37. Id. at 595 (quoting L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 38. Id. at 596. 
 39. Id. at 587. 
 40. Id. at 588–93. 
 41. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 596–98. 
 42. Id. at 600. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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“confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life 
activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, 
work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and 
cultural enrichment.”45 Ultimately, the Court concluded that under 
Title II of the ADA, states are responsible for providing “community-
based treatment to qualified persons.”46 
The Court said that the requirement to provide community-based 
treatment, however, is not limitless.47 States have to make 
“‘reasonable modifications’ to avoid discrimination,” but do not 
require a “fundamental alteration” of their services and programs.48 
The Supreme Court thought that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for 
evaluating a state’s fundamental alteration defense was too 
restrictive.49 The Court recognized that states need “[t]o maintain a 
range of facilities and to administer services with an even hand.”50 
Therefore, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to 
“consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only the 
cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the 
range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities, 
and the State’s obligation to mete out those services equitably.”51 
Specifically, the Court determined that a state could meet the 
reasonable-modifications standard if, for example, it could 
“demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan 
for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less 
restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace 
not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully 
populated.”52  
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. at 601. 
 46. Id. at 597, 603. According to the court, a person would be “qualified” for community-based 
treatment once such treatment was determined appropriate by the State’s treatment professionals and not 
opposed by the affected individual. Id. at 607. 
 47. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 597. 
 50. Id. at 605; see also id. at 597. 
 51. Id. at 597. 
 52. Id. at 605–06.  
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The Supreme Court did not say that each state is required to have a 
comprehensive and effectively working plan and a waiting list that 
moves at a reasonable pace.53  Rather, this was just one an example 
of how a state could meet the reasonable-modifications standard 
under the ADA.54 However, the federal government views the 
development of an effectively working plan as a critical component 
of Olmstead compliance.55 Within months of Olmstead, the federal 
government’s Center for Medicaid and State Operations Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA)56 wrote a series of letters to State 
Medicaid Directors emphasizing the importance of the Olmstead 
decision and advising states how they could comply with the Court’s 
holding.57 The first letter, dated January 14, 2000, strongly urged 
states to “increase access to community-based services for 
individuals with disabilities by developing comprehensive, 
effectively working plans for ensuring compliance with the ADA.”58 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Olmstead, 527 U.S at 605–06.  
 54. Id. 
 55. See discussion infra notes 56–61. Additionally, the Third Circuit has stated that it views “a 
comprehensive . . . working plan [as] a necessary component of a successful ‘fundamental alteration’ 
defense.” Frederick III, 422 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 56. The HCFA is now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). This federal agency 
is a branch of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and it administers the Medicaid 
program. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, History Overview, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/History/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 57. HCFA Letter 1, supra note 7; Letters from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, Center for 
Medicaid and State Operations Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to State Medicaid 
Director, Update No. 2 and Update No. 3 (July 25, 2000), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SMDL/SMD/list.asp; Letters from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, 
Center for Medicaid and State Operations Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to State 
Medicaid Director, Update No. 4 and Update No. 5, (Jan. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/SMDL/SMD/list.asp. The HCFA wrote to State Medicaid directors, because it 
recognized the critical role that Medicaid programs play in making community services available to 
people with disabilities. HCFA Letter 1, supra note 7. Medicaid is the “major source of public financing 
for long-term services and supports for people with disabilities.” KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID 
AND THE UNINSURED, POL’Y BRIEF, OLMSTEAD V. L.C.: THE INTERACTION OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT AND MEDICAID 2 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Olmstead-
v-L-C-The-Interaction-of-the-Americans-with-Disabilities-Act-and-Medicaid.pdf [hereinafter KAISER 
COMMISSION]. When it comes to paying for long-term care, Medicaid finances about 49%, Medicare 
pays about 20%, and the rest come from other public and private sources. ENID KASSNER, ET AL., AARP 
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, A BALANCING ACT: STATE LONG-TERM CARE REFORM 1 (2008). 
 58. HCFA Letter 1, supra note 7. 
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The HFCA provided states with “key principles”59 for developing 
their plans, and said that these principles would “be used by the 
Office for Civil Rights as it investigates complaints and conducts 
compliance reviews involving ‘most integrated setting’ issues.”60 
Although the guidance letters greatly assisted states in determining 
their obligations, the Supreme Court itself left open the question of 
what constitutes a comprehensive and effectively working plan and a 
waiting list that moves at a reasonable pace.61 Several years after 
Olmstead, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals provided different interpretations of Olmstead, 
explaining what it means for a state to have an effectively working 
plan and when states may avail themselves of the fundamental 
alteration defense.62  
II.   DEFINING AN EFFECTIVELY WORKING PLAN 
Following the Olmstead decision, many states began developing 
Olmstead plans in order to satisfy the Court’s requirements.63 
Unfortunately, the Olmstead Court did not explain what it meant by 
an effectively working plan.64 The Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit 
are the only appellate courts that have addressed the question of what 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. According to the HFCA, a state’s plan would build upon the foundation of existing programs 
and identify improvements that could be made to strengthen that foundation. Id. The plan would 
establish procedures for identifying and evaluating individuals who may be eligible to receive services 
in community-based settings rather than in institutions. Id. Additionally, the plan should assess the 
adequacy of current community-based programs and identify what improvements are needed to make 
the system “better” and more “comprehensive” in order to “[e]nsure the [a]vailability of [c]ommunity-
[i]ntegrated [s]ervices.” Id. The HCFA advised states to include people with disabilities and their 
representatives in the planning and implementation process. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Cerreto, supra note 1, at 69; Sara Rosenbaum et al., Defining “Reasonable Pace” in the Post-
Olmstead Environment 1 (Ctr. for Health Care Strategies, Consumer Action Series, Working Paper, 
2002), available at www.chcs.org/usr_doc/reasonablepace.pdf. 
 62. See Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005); Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. 
Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 620–22 (9th Cir. 2005); Frederick III, 422 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2005); see 
also infra Part II. 
 63. See generally KITCHENER ET AL., supra note 8. 
 64. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603; Melody M. Kubo, Implementing Olmstead v. L.C.: Defining 
Effectively Working Plans for Reasonably Paced Wait Lists for Medicaid Home and Community-Based 
Services Waiver Programs, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 731, 733 (2001). 
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constitutes an effectively working plan.65 The two circuit courts have 
diverging approaches to evaluating a state’s Olmstead plan.66  
A.   The Ninth Circuit Approach 
As illustrated by Sanchez v. Johnson and Arc of Washington State, 
Inc. v. Braddock, the Ninth Circuit does not require states to produce 
written Olmstead plans with measurable outcomes and target 
deadlines.67 A state may demonstrate that it has an effectively 
working plan if it has made significant progress in (1) moving people 
out of institutions, (2) increasing its budget for community services in 
spite of fiscal constraints, and (3) increasing the size of its Home and 
Community Based Services (HCBS) waiver program68 over time.69  
In Sanchez v. Johnson, a class of developmentally disabled 
individuals and service providers claimed that the State of California 
violated Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act by paying lower wages and benefits to community-based service 
                                                                                                                 
 65. For a list of Olmstead related cases through October 2006, see KITCHENER ET AL., supra note 8, 
Table 2. 
 66. See infra Part II(A)–(B) for a discussion of each court’s approach. 
 67. See discussion of Sanchez, infra notes 72–88 and accompanying text and the discussion of Arc of 
Wash. State, infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.  
 68. HCBS waivers permit (but do not require) states to use part of their Medicaid funds to provide 
home and community-based services as an alternative to institutionalization. Joanne Karger, Note, 
“Don’t Tread on the ADA”: Olmstead v. L.C. Ex Rel. Zimring and the Future of Community Integration 
for Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1221, 1229 (1999). The HCBS waiver program 
has been central to most states’ Olmstead plans. See DEBRA LIPSON, ET AL., MONEY FOLLOWS THE 
PERSON DEMONSTRATION GRANTS: SUMMARY OF STATE MFP PROGRAM APPLICATIONS 8 (Aug. 2007) 
(reporting that HCBS spending as a percentage of Medicaid total long-term care (LTC) spending 
increased 52.7% in the U.S. from 2001 to 2006); Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, HCBS 
Waivers - Section 1915 (c), 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/05_HCBSWaivers-Section1915(c).asp (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2009) (“The HCBS waiver program in particular is a viable option for states to use to 
provide integrated community-based long-term care services and supports to qualified Medicaid eligible 
recipients . . . . Forty-eight States and the District of Columbia offer services through HCBS waivers.”). 
 69. Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1067; Arc of Wash. State, 427 F.3d at 621–22. In order for states to receive 
HCBS waivers, they must apply “for a certain number of waiver slots.” Karger, supra note 68, at 1229. 
The number of waiver “slots” that the state applies for acts as a cap on the number of services it can 
provide under the HCBS Waiver Program. KAISER COMMISSION, supra note 57, at 3. The waiver 
program is budget neutral, so the cost of providing services in the community cannot exceed the cost of 
institutionalization. KAISER COMMISSION, supra note 57, at 3. 
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/2





providers than it paid to institutional employees.70 They argued that 
this disparity resulted in “some developmentally disabled persons 
remaining unnecessarily institutionalized” and sought an injunction 
to compel increased payments to community-based service providers 
by state officials.71 The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the State, holding that the relief sought by Sanchez and the 
providers was “not a ‘reasonable modification’ of California’s current 
policies and practices.”72 Furthermore, the court held, the State 
already had an acceptable plan for deinstitutionalization, and 
disrupting that plan “would involve a fundamental alteration of the 
State’s current policies and practices in contravention of the Supreme 
Court’s instructions in Olmstead.”73 The Ninth Circuit agreed that 
California had a comprehensive and effective plan for 
deinstitutionalization, and thus was in compliance with Olmstead.74 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “California ha[d] a 
successful record of personalized evaluations leading to a reasonable 
rate of deinstitutionalization and, moreover, that California ha[d] 
undertaken to continue and to increase its efforts to place 
[institutionalized individuals] into the community when such 
placement [was] feasible.”75  
The appellate court explained that the State had a system for 
identifying the services that institutionalized individuals needed to 
live in the community and a database that indicated whether the 
institutionalized individuals were recommended for community 
placement.76 The State also utilized a system of individualized 
“Community Placement Plans” to move institutionalized persons to 
community residential settings.77 These plans often involved 
“enhancing and developing the local resources” that the individual 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 71. Id. at 1055, 1062. 
 72. Id. at 1063. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 1067–68. 
 75. Id. at 1068. 
 76. Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1065–66. 
 77. Id. at 1066. 
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would need in the community.78 Furthermore, the State had twenty-
one Regional Centers that “determine[d] if a consumer need[ed] to be 
institutionalized” based on an Individual Program Plan that was 
prepared and reviewed annually by the responsible Regional 
Center.79  
The district court found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that 
California’s commitment to deinstitutionalization of developmentally 
disabled persons was “genuine, comprehensive, and reasonable.”80 
They based their finding on evidence that the State had: (1) increased 
its spending for community-based services over the previous ten 
years,81 (2) expanded its HCBS waiver program by 25,000 slots in 
the last three years,82 (3) decreased its institutionalized population by 
20% over the previous four years,83 (4) budgeted to develop fifty-two 
additional community-based treatment facilities,84 and (5) expected 
the reduction in its institutional population to result in the closure of 
at least one institution by 2007.85  
In Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock, a privately operating 
residence and three individuals with disabilities claimed that the State 
of Washington violated Title II of the ADA by not applying for 
enough HCBS waivers for all eligible developmentally disabled 
individuals.86 The Ninth Circuit found that Washington had a 
comprehensive, effectively working plan, and that the State’s 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1064. 
 80. Id. at 1067. 
 81. Id. (“Overall, California’s expenditures for individuals in community settings increased 196% 
between 1991 and 2001, while caseload . . . increased fifty-five percent in the same period.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 82. Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1067. Although California had more than 45,000 waiver places approved 
and received matched funds for about 35,000 registered persons in 2002, waiver places increased to 
nearly 70,000 by October, 2005. Id. at 1065. 
 83. Id. at 1067. 
 84. Id. At the time of this case, in California, developmentally disabled individuals received care in 
the community through Intermediate Care Facilities, Community Care Facilities, or through a variety of 
non-residential day programs and residential support services. Id. at 1065. 
 85. Id. at 1067. At the time of this case, in California, “approximately 3,800 [developmentally 
disabled persons] live[d] in one of seven large, congregate institutions called Developmental Centers.” 
Id. at 1064. 
 86. Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 617–19 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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commitment to deinstitutionalization was “‘genuine, comprehensive 
and reasonable.’”87 The court focused its analysis on the State’s 
HCBS waiver program.88 The court found that the HCBS program 
was full with new participants receiving waivers as they became 
available.89 The State increased its waiver program by 8,750 slots 
between 1983 and 1998 and had increased its annual budget for 
community-based disability programs from $167 million in 1994 to 
$350 million in 2001, during which time other state agencies 
experienced significant cutbacks.90 Additionally, the state decreased 
its institutional population by 20%, leaving only 1,000 individuals in 
institutions.91 The court decided that forced expansion of 
Washington’s HCBS waiver program would be a “fundamental 
alteration” and thus was not required under Olmstead or the ADA.92  
As Sanchez and Arc of Washington State illustrate, a state is not 
required to have a written plan for moving a specific number of 
people out of institutions or off of the HCBS waiver waiting list by a 
set date. Rather, a state may prove that it has an effectively working 
plan if it demonstrates its past progress in moving people out of 
institutions, expanding its HCBS waiver programs, and increasing its 
spending on community-based services.  
B.   Third Circuit Approach 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit requires that states 
show more than a past commitment to deinstitutionalization in order 
to utilize the fundamental alteration defense.93 As expressed in 
Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Public Welfare, the Third Circuit requires 
that states have plans with specific and measurable goals for which 
they may be held accountable.94 In Frederick L., a class of 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. at 621 (quoting Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1067). 
 88. See id. at 620. 
 89. Id. at 621. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Arc of Wash. State, 427 F.3d at 621–22. 
 93. Frederick III, 422 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 94. Id. at 156. 
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institutionalized mental health patients, who were eligible to receive 
community-based treatment, claimed that the State violated the ADA 
by keeping them in a state hospital.95 In Frederick I, the district court 
found that the accommodation requested by the plaintiffs would 
amount to a fundamental alteration of the state’s mental health 
program.96 The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the case, 
directing the lower court to “instruct [the Department of Public 
Welfare] to devise a plan which would demonstrate a commitment to 
community placement ‘in a manner for which it can be held 
accountable by the courts.’”97 On remand, the district court again 
ruled in favor of the State, and the mental health patients appealed.98 
The Third Circuit vacated and remanded once more, providing 
specific guidelines to the district court for evaluating the state’s 
deinstitutionalization plan.99  
Although the Third Circuit noted that it was “aware of [the state’s] 
strong commitment in the past to deinstitutionalization (viz., 
Pennsylvania’s mental health hospital population ha[d] declined from 
40,000 in the 1950s to fewer than 3,000 at the time of trial),” it did 
not find this record sufficient to meet the requirements of 
Olmstead.100 The court was looking for verifiable benchmarks or 
timelines.101 The court found that the State’s deinstitutionalization 
plan102 was inadequate.103 The draft plan included measurable goals, 
such as reducing the number of state hospital beds by a minimum of 
250 each year and “closing ‘all civil beds in at least three state 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 154 (citing Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 217 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) [hereinafter Frederick I]). 
 96. Frederick III, 422 F.3d at 155 (citing Frederick I, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 594). 
 97. Frederick III, 422 F.3d at 155 (quoting Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487, 500 
(3d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Frederick II]). 
 98. Frederick III, 422 F.3d at 155.  
 99. Id. at 160. 
 100. Id. at 156. 
 101. Id. 
 102. “The cornerstone of [the State’s] deinstitutionalization plan [was] the Community/Hospital 
Integration Projects Program (CHIPP),” which was designed to “reorient ‘the focus of mental health 
services away from reliance on large [mental health] institutions to community based treatment.’” Id. at 
157. 
 103. Id. at 158. 
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psychiatric hospitals.’”104 However, the State did not include these 
specific goals in its final plan.105 Rather, in its final plan, the State 
“substituted the more amorphous, i.e., non-specific, goal of closing 
‘up to 250 [ ] beds a year.’”106  
The court explicitly rejected the State’s “general assurances and 
good faith intentions to effectuate deinstitutionalization.”107 Such 
“general assurances and good faith intentions,” said the court, 
“neither meet the federal laws nor a patient’s expectations.”108 The 
court also worried that the State’s commitment to “implementation 
may change with each administration or Secretary of Welfare,” if the 
State did not “articulate this commitment in the form of an 
adequately specific comprehensive plan for placing eligible patients 
in community-based programs by a target date.”109 The Third Circuit 
refused to accept the State’s fundamental alteration defense without a 
plan that would: 
[S]pecify the time-frame or target date for patient discharge, the 
approximate number of patients to be discharged each time period, 
the eligibility for discharge, and a general description of the 
collaboration required between the local authorities and the housing, 
transportation, care, and education agencies to effectuate integration 
into the community.110  
III.   DOES GEORGIA HAVE AN EFFECTIVELY WORKING PLAN? 
Georgia, as the ‘Olmstead State,’ should be leading the country in 
the process of deinstitutionalization.111 But nine years after the 
decision, the State has come up short in the development and 
implementation of its own Olmstead Plan.112 Although “Olmstead 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Frederick III, 422 F.3d at 158. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 158–59. 
 110. Frederick III, 422 F.3d at 160. 
 111. Georgia is the ‘Olmstead State’ because the Olmstead case originated in Georgia.  
 112. See infra Part III (discussing Georgia’s Olmstead Plan). 
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Plans form the foundation for compliance with the Court’s decision 
in Olmstead and the marker against which their compliance can be 
assessed,”113 Georgia has failed to produce a plan for which it can be 
held accountable.114 Under the Third Circuit’s approach to evaluating 
a State’s deinstitutionalization plan, Georgia’s plan is grossly 
inadequate.115 The state has, however, made progress toward 
transitioning individuals out of institutions—expanding its HCBS 
waiver programs and increasing its spending on community-based 
services—which would probably satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s standard 
for an effectively working plan.116 However, in order to continue 
meeting the Ninth Circuit’s requirements, Georgia cannot allow fiscal 
constraints to impede its progress in the future.117 
A.   Olmstead Planning in Georgia 
Georgia began its Olmstead planning process shortly after the 
Supreme Court’s decision with the creation of its Blue Ribbon Task 
Force (BRTF) by Governor Roy Barnes in December 1999. 118 The 
BRTF had seventeen members, including consumers (people with 
disabilities), parents, advocates, and other professionals.119 The 
group’s purpose was to gather information and advise the Governor 
and the state legislature on the status of and future need for 
community services in Georgia; to identify barriers that prevent 
access to those services; to make funding recommendations; to give 
advice on how to prioritize services; and to identify possible waiting 
list criteria.120 The group gathered information through public 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Cerreto, supra note 1, at 64. 
 114. See infra Part III (discussing Georgia’s Olmstead Plan). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See infra Part III.C. 
 117. See id. (discussing Georgia’s Olmstead Plan). 
 118. GOVERNOR’S BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE ON HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES, FINAL 
REPORT 1 (Jan. 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter BRTF REPORT]. 
 119. Id. at 2.  
 120. Id. at 1. 
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meetings, hearings, and surveys and provided their recommendations 
in the Final Report, dated January 2001.121 
A month later, the Georgia Department of Human Resources 
(DHR) received a grant from the Center for Health Care Strategies to 
develop an Olmstead Plan.122 After receiving the grant, the state 
established an Olmstead Planning Committee.123 The Planning 
Committee held eight meetings between February and October 2001, 
during which time the committee members reviewed the 
recommendations from the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Task Force as 
well as the guidelines provided in the January 2000 Letter to State 
Medicaid Directors.124 The committee’s task was to develop an action 
plan for providing services in compliance with the ADA and the 
Olmstead decision.125 The committee divided into workgroups, which 
included consumers, family members, service providers, state 
hospital representatives, advocates, and state agency staff 
members.126 The Committee completed its Final Report and 
Recommendations in November 2001.127 
The Olmstead Planning Committee’s final report contained 
recommendations for moving people out of institutions and 
increasing system capacity in communities.128 Their report included a 
list of action steps, the agency responsible for each action item, and 
the target date for completion of the action item.129 With the 
estimates available to it, the committee made recommendations for 
moving specific numbers of individuals out of institutions by certain 
dates.130 Additionally, the committee provided the following 
recommendations for increasing system capacity: infrastructure 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. at 3–4.  
 122. OLMSTEAD PLANNING COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (Nov. 2001) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter OLMSTEAD COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 8–9. See supra notes 57–60 (discussing the HCFA letters). 
 125. OLMSTEAD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 122, at 8. 
 126. Id. at 8–9. 
 127. See generally id. 
 128. Id. at 4–7.  
 129. Id. at 9. 
 130. Id. at 20–57. See also infra text accompanying notes 154–55, 170–71. 
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improvements in the areas of housing and transportation; service 
expansion; provider development; and workforce development.131 
Unfortunately, Governor Barnes would not commit to implementing 
the committee’s recommendations, and “[n]o plan [was] formally 
submitted.”132  
Two years after the Olmstead Planning Committee completed its 
report, Governor Sonny Perdue announced the release of Georgia’s 
Strategic Olmstead Plan.133 The plan was a modified version of the 
committee’s report, with no measurable outcomes, no target dates, 
and “[n]o mechanism for accountability.”134 Rather, it was merely a 
“document of intents.”135  
The plan “sets the strategic direction and broad parameters for 
addressing community-integrated service delivery.”136 It calls for (1) 
the identification of individuals in state hospitals, nursing homes and 
those at risk for institutionalization who would be affected by the 
plan, (2) an evaluation of those individuals to see if they would 
benefit from community services, and (3) subsequent periodic 
assessments of the individuals.137 The plan, however, fails to specify 
who will conduct the assessment, what the assessment will entail, or 
what schedule the initial and subsequent evaluations will follow.138 
Additionally, under the plan, the state is supposed to respond to the 
assessments in a timely and effective manner by providing 
individuals with services or placing them on a waiting list.139 
                                                                                                                 
 131. OLMSTEAD  COMMITTEE  REPORT, supra note 122, at 58–91. 
 132. Governor’s Council on Developmental Disabilities, Georgia Advocacy Office, Institute on 
Human Development and Disability & Marcus Institute, State of Developmental Disabilities in Georgia 
(PowerPoint Presentation), slide 4, available at http://www.gcdd.org/ppt/presentation/ (follow link to 
DD_Show Final.ppt) [hereinafter GCDD PPT]. 
 133. Press Release, Office of Communications of Governor Sonny Perdue, Governor Perdue Releases 
Georgia’s Olmstead Plan (Feb. 4, 2004), available at http://www.gov.state.ga.us/press/2004/ 
press362.shtml [hereinafter Gov. Perdue Press Release]. 
 134. GCDD PPT., supra note 132, at slide 4; see also Governor Sonny Perdue, State of Georgia 
Olmstead Strategic Plan (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.files.georgia.gov/DHR/ 
DHR_CommonFiles/16739455Olmstead_Plan__Perdue_.pdf [hereinafter Olmstead Strategic Plan]. 
 135. GCDD PPT, supra note 132, at slide 4. 
 136. Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134, at 7. 
 137. Id. at 8.  
 138. See generally id. 
 139. Id. at 9–10. 
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However, the plan does not say when individuals will be moved from 
institutions, how many will receive services before the waiting list 
goes into effect, or what the state will do to get people moved off the 
waiting list.140 
While the governor presented the Olmstead Strategic Plan as “a 
working document that [would] continue to evolve over time,”141 no 
effort was made to update the plan until 2008 when Georgia entered 
into a settlement agreement with the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office for Civil Rights.142 Under the Settlement 
Agreement, Georgia is required to update its Olmstead Plan by 
February 2009, providing “new, concrete and realistic annual 
Olmstead goals.”143 Specifically, Georgia’s plan must “include an 
annual schedule of anticipated discharges” for those institutionalized 
individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (DD) 
and/or mental health disabilities (MH) who are capable of receiving 
treatment in the community and who would like to do so.144 
Additionally, the plan must specify how the state will “obtain and/or 
maintain necessary community services for those at risk for 
institutionalization.”145 Georgia’s new plan must be approved by an 
Olmstead Committee, which includes people with disabilities and 
their representatives as well as service providers and key decision-
makers from state agencies.146 The state must regularly report to the 
Olmstead Committee regarding its progress in implementing the new 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. Georgia Department of Community Health, What Is the Olmstead Decision?, 
http://dch.georgia.gov/00/channel_title/0,2094,31446711_31848276,00.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). 
 142. Voluntary Compliance Agreement Between the State of Georgia and the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, Preamble (July 2008), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/activities/agreements/georgiaagree.html [hereinafter Compliance 
Agreement]. The State entered the settlement agreement after the Georgia Advocacy Office, the Atlanta 
Legal Aid Society, Inc., the Georgia Legal Services Program, and the Disability Law Policy Center of 
Georgia, Inc. filed class complaints with the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, Office for 
Civil Rights, claiming that the State failed to treat qualified persons with disabilities in the most 
integrated setting appropriate in violation of Title II of the ADA. Id.  
 143. Id. art. I, § IV(A). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. art. I, § IV(B). 
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plan, and the Olmstead Committee is responsible for releasing a 
progress report to the public each December.147 
B.   Georgia’s Progress in Implementing Olmstead 
Despite the fact that Georgia has been operating under a 
“document of intents” since 2003, the state has made progress in 
implementing the Olmstead decision.148 Below is a summary of the 
progress Georgia has made with respect to (1) moving people out of 
institutions, (2) expanding the waiver programs, and (3) moving 
people off the waiting lists.149  
1.   Moving Individuals out of Institutions 
In its November 2001 report, Georgia’s Olmstead Planning 
Committee made recommendations for moving a specific number of 
people with mental retardation and developmental disabilities 
(MR/DD) and people with mental illnesses out of institutions and into 
more integrated settings within a set timeframe.150 Although Georgia 
has not complied with the recommendations of the Committee, the 
state has made some progress in moving people with MR/DD and 
mental illnesses out of institutions.151  
 a.   Individuals with Mental Retardation and Developmental 
Disabilities 
In its November 2001 report, the Olmstead Planning Committee 
estimated that over 1,568 individuals with mental retardation and 
developmental disabilities (MR/DD) lived in public and private 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. art. I, § IV(E)–(F). 
 148. See supra Part III.A. 
 149. See infra Part III.B.1–3.  
 150. See, e.g., infra notes 152–54, 170–71. The committee noted that there was “no single, 
comprehensive survey indicating the number of institutionalized persons who are appropriate for 
community-based services,” and the committee struggled to obtain reliable numbers, so its 
recommendations are based on the best data available at the time of the report. OLMSTEAD COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 122, at 20. 
 151. See infra Part III.B.1.a–b. 
20
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/2





institutions in Georgia.152 The Committee noted that since 1996, the 
state had succeeded in reducing the number of persons living in state-
operated institutions by more than 500 people.153 The committee 
recommended that the state move an additional 1,507 individuals 
with MR/DD from institutions by 2008.154  
In 2001, the state closed Bainbridge State Hospital (BSH), a 100 
bed mental retardation facility.155 This closure, the state claimed, 
allowed it to move “100 people with mental retardation . . . into 
comprehensive community based services.”156 In his FY 2004 Budget 
Report, Governor Purdue announced that Georgia would be spending 
$10 million in FY 2003 to implement some of the Olmstead Planning 
Committee’s recommendations, including their suggestion to move 
sixty-five children with developmental disabilities out of state 
institutions. 157 Additionally, the Governor recommended that the 
state transition fifty adults with developmental disabilities to 
community services in FY 2004.158 Between 2001 and 2006, Georgia 
reduced the number of institutionalized individuals with MR/DD by a 
total of 493, a 14% reduction.159  
                                                                                                                 
 152. OLMSTEAD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 122, at 39. There were 1,458 persons living in 
public Intermediate Care Facilities for Mental Retardation (ICFs/MR) and Skilled Nursing Facilities 
(SNFs); another 110 were living in a private ICF/MR. Id. An additional 1,619 individuals with MR/DD 
lived in nursing homes. Id. Sixty-five of the individuals residing in state institutions were children (age 
twenty-one or younger). Id. at 42. 
 153. Id. at 39. 
 154. Specifically, the committee recommended that the state transfer all sixty-five children with 
MR/DD out of state hospitals by the end of 2001. Id. at 42. Each year, starting in FY 2003 and 
continuing through FY 2007, the committee wanted the State to move 301 adults with MR/DD out of 
public and private institutions. Id. at 45–46. Additionally, the Committee recommended moving 419 
adults with MR/DD from nursing homes each year. Id. 
 155. Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134, attachment A. The state closed three additional 
hospitals between 1996 and 2001: River’s Crossing (a thirty-seven bed facility for children with mental 
retardation), Brook Run (a 326 bed mental retardation facility), and Georgia Mental Health Institute (a 
141 bed psychiatric hospital). Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. Of course, this recommendation fell very short of meeting the Olmstead Committee’s 
recommendation of moving 720 individuals. OLMSTEAD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 122, at 45.  
 159. At the end of FY 2006, there were 1,075 persons with MR/DD living in public and private 
institutions (not including nursing homes) in Georgia. Interview with Dave Blanchard, Director, Atlanta 
Alliance on Developmental Disabilities (AADD) (Nov. 15, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Blanchard Interview]. But see LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 6 (reporting that 1,085 persons with 
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In 2006, the state applied for and received $34,091,671 through the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Money Follows the 
Person (MFP) Grant program.160 The grant program was designed to 
help states transition individuals from institutions into more 
integrated settings.161 In its grant application, the state set goals for 
transitioning a certain number of individuals out of institutions each 
year for five years, beginning in 2007.162 With respect to 
developmentally disabled individuals, the state planned to move 
seventy-five in FY2008, 150 in FY 2009, 150 in FY 2010, and 187 in 
FY 2011.163 Georgia also planned to reduce the number of beds in 
Intermediate Care Facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF-MR) by 
70% as patients transitioned to the community.164  
As of January 19, 2009, there were 925 individuals with 
developmental disabilities residing in institutions.165 This number 
                                                                                                                 
MR/DD lived in public and private ICFs/MR). There were still 110 individuals living in private 
ICFs/MR, and 1,620 individuals with MR/DD lived in nursing homes in 2006. Id.  
 160. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 36. In July 2006, the CMS announced that it would provide 
funding to states for alternatives to nursing home care under the Money Follows the Person Rebalancing 
Initiative. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS Provides Funding to States for 
Alternatives to Nursing Home Care in Medicaid (July 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060726.html [hereinafter HHS News Release]. CMS 
planned to give $1.75 billion over five years in demonstration grants to states “to help shift Medicaid 
from its historical emphasis on institutional long-term care services to a system that offers more choices 
for seniors and persons with disabilities from all age groups, including home and community-based 
services.” Id. As of August 2007, CMS has awarded grants to thirty states and the District of Columbia, 
committing over $1.4 billion for a five year period. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 3. 
 161. HHS News Release, supra note 160. Through these grants, the federal government effectively 
“will pay for 75 to 90 percent of the costs” to transition individuals out of nursing homes and provide 
services to them in the community for one year. Id. 
 162. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 2. During five years, the State planned to move 375 elderly 
people, 375 individuals with physical disabilities and/or traumatic brain injury, and 562 individuals with 
mental retardation and/or developmental disabilities. Id. at 37. The first year of the grant program was 
devoted to developing “Operational Protocols” with “measurable benchmarks of state progress towards 
program goals, and . . . a step-by-step guide to program implementation.” Id. at 2. During the remaining 
four years, the state planned to move 1312 individuals out of institutions and into home and community-
based programs. Id. at 37. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 36. 
 165. E-mail from Pat Nobbie, Deputy Director, Governor’s Council on Developmental Disabilities 
(GCDD), to author (Jan. 20, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nobbie E-mail I]. There were an 
additional sixty-five individuals residing in the Skilled Nursing Facility at Central State who were not 
technically classified as developmentally disabled. Id. 
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was down from 1,075 at the end of FY 2006,166 which means that the 
state moved at least 150 individuals with MR/DD between FY 2007 
and FY 2008. Thus the state has met its goal to move seventy-five 
individuals in FY 2008 under the MFP grant.167  
Since 2001, Georgia has transitioned a total of 643 individuals 
with MR/DD from institutions.168 While Georgia has made progress 
toward deinstitutionalization, it has fallen short of the Olmstead 
Planning Committee’s recommendation to move 1,507 individuals by 
2008.169 
 b.   Individuals with Mental Illness 
The Olmstead Planning Committee reported that in 2000, an 
estimated 237 adults and 698 children with mental illness resided in 
public mental health institutions.170 The Committee recommended 
that the state reduce the number of individuals with mental illness 
living in public institutions by 20% between FY 2003 and FY 
2008.171 In his FY 2004 Budget Report, the Governor said that the 
state had already committed funds to “[c]reate four state-run 
community homes for forty hard-to-place, severely emotionally 
disturbed adolescents currently in state hospitals” in FY 2003. 172  He 
recommended that the state move another fifteen mental health 
patients into the community in FY 2004. 173 When it applied for the 
MFP grant in 2006, the state promised to transition thirty-five 
individuals with mental illness out of state mental institutions using 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See sources cited supra note 159. 
 167. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 37. 
 168. In 2001, 1,568 individuals with MR/DD resided in institutions. See supra text accompanying 
note 152. Nine hundred and twenty-five individuals with MR/DD resided in institutions as of Jan. 19, 
2009. See supra text accompanying note 165. Thus, a total of 643 individuals with MR/DD have been 
removed from institutions since 2001. 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 154. 
 170. OLMSTEAD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 122, at 27, 31. An additional 2,907 people with 
mental illnesses were living in private nursing facilities. Id.at 32. Approximately 500 of the people with 
mental illness living in private nursing homes were also diagnosed with mental retardation. Id. 
 171. Id. at 30, 35. Specifically, the Committee recommended that the State transition the first 140 
children into more integrated settings by FY 2003. Id. at 30.  
 172. Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134, attachment A. 
 173. Id. 
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state funds.174 As of January 19, 2009, there were 523 adults and 44 
children residing in mental institutions.175 While it is not clear from 
these statistics whether the state succeeded in meeting the specific 
goals that it set, overall the state has succeeded in reducing the 
number of individuals with mental illness living in institutions.176 
2.   Expanding HCBS Waiver Programs 
Georgia’s primary means of funding community-based services for 
the disabled is through its HCBS waiver programs.177 These 
programs serve those who are transitioned from institutions as well as 
those who are at risk for institutionalization.178 The Mental 
Retardation Waiver Program (MRWP) and Community Habilitation 
and Community Habilitation and Support Services Program (CHSS) 
provide home and community-based support services to “people who 
have been diagnosed with mental retardation or other developmental 
disabilities, such as autism, cerebral palsy or epilepsy.”179 The 
                                                                                                                 
 174. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 37. 
 175. Nobbie E-mail I, supra note 165. 
 176. In 2000, there were 935 adults and children with mental illnesses residing in institutions. See 
supra text accompanying note 170. As of January 19, 2009, there were 567 adults and children with 
mental illnesses living in institutions. Nobbie E-mail I, supra note 165. It is not clear how many people 
the state actually transitioned because patients cycle in and out of public hospitals and may not stay 
long-term. OLMSTEAD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 122, at 31. The Olmstead Committee reported 
that 14,284 persons with mental illness were admitted to public institutions in FY 2000, but estimated 
that there were only 237 long-term (more than sixty days) mental health patients in the institutions at the 
time of the report. Id. at 31–32. Additionally, it is not clear how the data from year 2000 corresponds to 
the data from year 2008 because many of the children who resided in institutions in 2001 were probably 
adults in 2008. This may explain why the number of children in institutions has decreased so 
dramatically and the number of adults in institutions has risen. 
 177. Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134, at 11. Georgia’s waiver programs include the Mental 
Retardation Waiver Program (MRWP), the Independent Care Waiver Program (ICWP), the Community 
Habilitation and Support Services Program (CHSS), and the Community Care Services Program 
(CCSP). Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. The MRWP and CHSS waiver programs were replaced by the New Options Waiver (NOW 
waiver) and the Comprehensive Waiver (COMP waiver) in November 2008. Georgia Department of 
Human Resources, Division of MHDDAD, Office of DD, New Options Waiver (NOW) and 
Comprehensive Waiver (COMP) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) (2008) [hereinafter GDHR New 
Waivers]; Interview with Steve Hall, Director, Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities 
and Addictive Diseases (MHDDAD) (Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Steve Hall Interview]. For a 
discussion of the new waivers, see infra text accompanying notes 199–203.  
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Independent Care Waiver Program (ICWP) offers home and 
community-based services to people with physical disabilities and 
people with traumatic brain injuries.180 Georgia has expanded both of 
these waiver programs over the last ten years.181 
Between 1999 and 2003, Georgia increased the number of 
consumers served by community-based mental retardation waivers 
(MRWP) by 5,975.182 The Georgia General Assembly allocated 
funding for an additional 740 waivers between FY 2003 and FY 
2005.183 
In February 2005, the Georgia Legislature adopted a multi-year 
funding plan to increase the number of waivers that Georgia provides 
under the MRWP and ICWP over the course of five years.184 
Through the multi-year funding plan, the legislature planned to 
increase the number of MRWP waivers each year, but as Table 1 
illustrates, the state has not met its goals for several years.185  
                                                                                                                 
 180. Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134, at 11. 
 181. See infra text accompanying note 196–97. 
 182. Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134, attachment A. 
 183. Specifically, the General Assembly allocated funding for 507 waiver services in FY 2003; 203 
waiver services in FY 2004; and thirty waiver services in FY 2005. See generally Blanchard Interview, 
supra note 159. 
 184. Letter from Tim Burgess, Commissioner, to Glenn Richardson, Speaker of the Ga. House of 
Representatives (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.unlockthewaitinglists.com/ 
pdf/UnlockMultipleYearPlan.pdf [hereinafter Multi-Year Funding Plan]. 
 185. Id. 
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TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF MULTI-YEAR FUNDING PLAN TO ACTUAL 
INCREASE IN MRWP WAIVERS186 
Fiscal Year Multi-Year Funding 
Plan 
Actual/Approved 
FY 2006 1,000 new services 925 new services 
FY 2007 1,500 new services 1,500 new services187 
FY 2008 2,000 new services 1,500 new services 
FY 2009 2,500 365 new services188 
FY 1010 2,500 150 new services189 
Total 9,500 4,440 new services 
 
Under the multi-year funding plan, the state was also supposed to 
increase the number of individuals served by the ICWP waiver 
program from 321 to 2,101 over five years, which amounts to 356 
new waivers per year.190 As Table 2 illustrates, the state did not meet 
the goals of the Multi-Year Funding Plan for ICWP waivers. 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See id.; Conversations that Matter: Town Hall Meetings—School Transition to Adult Supports, 
Shamrock Middle School (Oct. 29, 2007) (remarks by Steve Hall, Director of the Division of Mental 
Health, Developmental Disabilities and Addictive Diseases) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Conversations that Matter]; Unlock the Waiting Lists!, How Many People Are Waiting?, 
http://www.unlockthewaitinglists.com/peoplewaiting.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2007). See generally 
Blanchard Interview, supra note 159; Telephone interview with Pat Nobbie, Deputy Director, 
Governor’s Council on Developmental Disabilities (GCDD) (Jan. 13, 2009) (on file with author). 
 187. Even though the governor only proposed funding for 750 waivers, the legislature budgeted for 
1,500 new waivers in FY 2007, which kept the state on track with the multi-year funding plan. FY2007 
General Budget: The current proposal within to fund 750 services for Georgia’s Waiting Lists for 
disability supports is a step backwards (Nov. 25, 2007) [hereinafter A Step Backwards] (on file with 
author); Blanchard Interview, supra note 159. 
 188. The legislature approved 500 waivers for FY 2009 during the 2008 legislative session, but the 
governor has proposed an amended budget for FY 2009 that would cut out 135 waivers. E-mail from 
Dave Blanchard, Director, Atlanta Alliance on Developmental Disabilities (AADD), to author (Jan. 15, 
2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Blanchard E-mail II]. 
 189. The governor proposed 150 new services. Telephone interview with Pat Nobbie, Deputy 
Director, Governor’s Council on Developmental Disabilities (GCDD) (Jan. 14, 2009) (on file with 
author). This proposed number of waivers would meet the minimum obligations that the State has under 
the Money Follows the Person Grant but does not provide additional waivers to help move individuals 
off the waiting list. 
 190. Id. 
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TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF MULTI-YEAR FUNDING PLAN TO ACTUAL 
ICWP WAIVERS191 
Fiscal Year Multi-Year Funding 
Plan 
Actual/Approved 
FY 2006 356 new services 46 new services 
FY 2007 356 new services 152 new services192 
FY 2008 356 new services 0 new services193 
FY 2009 356 new services 75 new services194 
FY 1010  356 new services 100 new services195 
Total 1,780 373 new services 
 
Although the state has not complied with the multi-year funding 
plan, there has been a net increase of 4,440 MRWP waivers and 373 
ICWP waivers between FY 2006 and FY 2010.196 Because Georgia 
has expanded its waiver programs, the state’s overall spending on 
community-based services has increased as well. Between 2001 and 
2006, Georgia increased its spending on HCBS Waiver programs 
from $178,743,578 to $402,099,710—a 125% increase.197 The 
State’s spending on HCBS MR/DD waivers increased 188.8% from 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See Multi-Year Funding Plan, supra note 184; E-mail from Pat Puckett, Executive Director, 
Statewide Independent Living Council of Georgia, Inc., to author (Jan. 22, 2009) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Puckett E-mail]. 
 192. The Governor’s budget proposal did not include any funding for new ICWP waiver slots for FY 
2007. Unlock the Waiting Lists!, FY2007 General Budget: The Governor’s current proposal 
recommends no new funding for the Independent Care Waiver Program (ICWP), 
http://www.unlockthewaitinglists.com/pdf/ICWP.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). But, thanks to the 
lobbying efforts of advocates such as the Atlanta Alliance for Developmental Disabilities (AADD), the 
legislature eventually included 152 ICWP waiver slots in the FY 2007 budget. Puckett E-mail, supra 
note 191. 
 193. The state should have funded at least fifty ICWP waivers under the Money Follows the Person 
(MFP) grant to transition fifty people with physical disabilities or traumatic brain injuries out of 
institutions. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 37. 
 194. The state should have funded at least 100 waivers to transition people with physical disabilities 
and traumatic brain injuries from institutions in FY 2009. Id. 
 195. The Governor has proposed 100 ICWP waivers for the FY 2010 budget, which would match the 
state’s commitment under the MFP grant. Blanchard E-mail II, supra note 188; LIPSON, ET AL., supra 
note 68, at 37. 
 196. See supra Tables 1 and 2. 
 197. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 8. 
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2001 to 2006 while spending on ICF/MR (institutions) remained 
constant over the same time period.198  
Not only has Georgia increased the number of HCBS waivers that 
it provides, the state has also made new services and options 
available under the waiver programs. For example, Georgia has 
replaced the MRWP and HCSS waiver programs with two new 
waivers: the New Options Waiver (NOW waiver) and the 
Comprehensive Waiver (COMP waiver).199 The new waivers provide 
dental services, transportation services, and the option for individuals 
to self-direct their services rather than relying on third-party service 
coordinators.200 Additionally, the new waivers include quality 
assurance components and community guides who work with 
disabled individuals to create personal budgets and find community-
based services.201 The new waivers were approved by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in October of 2007 and 
became effective on November 1, 2008; individuals have the option 
to transfer to the new waivers on the date of their birthday.202  
3.   Moving Individuals off of the HCBS Waiting Lists 
The Governor’s Blue Ribbon Task Force on Home and 
Community Based Services summarized the status of the HCBS 
waiting lists in Georgia in its January 2001 report.203 According to 
the Task Force, 2,156 people with mental retardation and/or 
developmental disabilities and 250 people with physical disabilities 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. at 9. 
 199. GDHR New Waivers, supra note 179; see also Steve Hall Interview, supra note 179. The NOW 
waiver provides supports for people with MR/DD who live with their parents while the COMP waiver 
provides residence for people with MR/DD. Conversations that Matter, supra note 186. 
 200. GDHR New Waivers, supra note 179. For example, the new waivers provide dental services, 
transportation services, and the option for individuals to self-direct their services rather than relying on a 
third-party service coordinator. Id. 
 201. Steve Hall Interview, supra note 179. 
 202. Id. Although the transition from the old waivers to the new waivers was supposed to begin in 
October, 2007, the process was delayed because the Georgia Department of Community of Health had 
to update its Medicaid payment system. Id. The payment system update cost the State $1 million. E-mail 
from Pat Nobbie, Deputy Director, Governor’s Council on Developmental Disabilities (GCDD), to 
author (Nov. 28, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nobbie E-mail II]. 
 203. BRTF REPORT, supra note 118, at 1. 
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were waiting to receive waivers; 3,758 older Medicaid-eligible adults 
were on HCBS waiting lists; and 5,885 older adults who were not 
eligible for Medicaid were waiting to receive state funded 
community-based services.204 Furthermore, the Task Force said, an 
undocumented number of people were waiting to receive mental 
health services.205  
The state’s efforts to expand the MRWP waiver programs have not 
been adequate to meet the demands of the growing waiting list.206 
Although the state has increased the number of available MRWP 
waivers each year between FY 2004 and FY 2008, the number of 





No. of People on the 
Waiting List 
No. of New Waiver 
Services Provided 
FY 2004 4,894 230 
FY 2005 5,960 30 
FY 2006 6,948 925 
FY 2007 5,182 1,500 
FY 2008 5,542 1,500 
 
There are three reasons that the waiver list continues to grow 
despite the state’s efforts to expand the MRWP program. First, the 
MRWP waiting list, on average, increases by over 1,000 people each 
year while the number of individuals leaving the waiver program is 
only about 2–8%.208 Second, individuals on the waiting list may be 
                                                                                                                 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. In adopting the multi-year funding plan, the General Assembly acknowledged that it was “barely 
adequate to address” the growing waiting list. Multi-Year Funding Plan, supra note 184. The plan was 
meant to keep pace with the growth of the waiting list, but since the State has not met the goals of the 
multi-year funding plan, the growth of the waiting list has outpaced the expansion of the waiver 
program. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 184–95 (discussing the multi-year funding plan). 
 207. See generally Blanchard Interview, supra note 159; E-mail from Dave Blanchard, Director, 
Atlanta Alliance on Developmental Disabilities (AADD), to author (April 4, 2008) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Blanchard E-mail I]. 
 208. A Step Backwards, supra note 187; Multi-Year Funding Plan, supra note 184. 
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eligible to receive more than one waiver service, so the number of 
waivers funded by the state does not equal the number of people that 
are removed from the waiting list.209 Third, the waiting list only 
represents those who are currently living in the community and need 
services; the number of people transitioning from institutions is not 
reflected on the MRWP waiting list.210 
C.   Evaluation of Georgia’s Olmstead Plan Under the Circuit 
Courts’ Standards 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals requires a state to develop a 
plan with specific measures and outcomes for which it may be held 
accountable. 211 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, looks at the 
state’s past progress in moving people out of institutions, expanding 
its Medicaid waiver programs, and increasing funds for community-
based services despite fiscal constraints.212 Under both approaches, 
Georgia fails to demonstrate that it has an effectively working plan. 
1.   Third Circuit Approach 
The Olmstead Planning Committee report from November 2001 
contained specific measures and outcomes and thus would have 
satisfied the Third Circuit’s definition of an effectively working 
plan.213 However, the Committee Report was not adopted as 
Georgia’s Olmstead Plan.214 The Olmstead Strategic Plan that was 
published in 2003 did not contain any measurable outcomes, target 
                                                                                                                 
 209. A Step Backwards, supra note 187. For example, in FY 2007 the State allocated funding for 1500 
waiver services which were provided to 1300 people on the waiting list. See Blanchard Interview, supra 
note 159. 
 210. A Step Backwards, supra note 187. Thus, if the state only provides funding for 150 MRWP 
waiver services in FY 2010 and that is the number of people with developmental disabilities who are 
going to be transitioned out of institutions under the Money Follows the Person Grant, then the new 
waivers do not help reduce the number of people on the waiting list.  
 211. Frederick III, 422 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 212. Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. 
Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 620–22 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 213. Frederick III, 422 F.3d at 160. 
 214. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
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dates, or “mechanism for accountability.”215 Rather, the Olmstead 
Strategic Plan was a “document of intents” with a broad list of goals 
and no specific guidance for accomplishing those goals.216 This type 
of plan is unacceptable to the Third Circuit, which said that a state’s 
“general assurances and good faith intentions to effectuate 
deinstitutionalization” may be genuine, but they “neither meet the 
federal laws nor a patient’s expectations.”217  
The fact that the state has made progress in reducing the number of 
people with developmental disabilities in institutions over the last 
nine years is not enough to satisfy the Third Circuit.218 Without a 
plan that provides “concrete, measurable benchmarks and a 
reasonable timeline,” patients are not able “to ascertain when, if ever, 
they will be discharged to appropriate community services.”219 
Through the multi-year funding plan and the MFP Grant, the state 
established five-year goals for which it can be held accountable, as 
required by the Third Circuit.220 Unfortunately, Georgia has not met 
the goals of the multi-year funding plan and the MFP grant for the 
last few years.221  
In July 2008, Georgia entered into an Olmstead settlement 
agreement with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of Compliance, which requires the state to develop an 
Olmstead plan with “new, concrete and realistic annual Olmstead 
goals.”222 If, as required by the settlement agreement, the new plan 
includes an annual schedule of anticipated discharges and specifies 
how the state will “obtain and/or maintain necessary community 
                                                                                                                 
 215. GCDD PPT, supra note 132, at 4. See generally Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134. 
 216. GCDD PPT, supra note 132, at 4; Olmstead Strategic Plan, supra note 134; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 133–40. 
 217. Frederick III, 422 F.3d at 158. 
 218. Id. at 155. 
 219. Id. (noting that Pennsylvania had reduced its mental health hospital population from 40,000 in 
1950 to less than 3,000 at the time of trial, but that the state had failed to provide measurable goals for 
community integration for which it could be held accountable). 
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 160–64, 174 for a discussion of the Money Follows the 
Person Grant and text accompanying notes 184–96 for a discussion of the multi-year funding plan. 
 221. See supra text accompanying notes 184–95. 
 222. Compliance Agreement, supra note 142, art. I, § IV(A). 
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services for those at risk for institutionalization,” then it would meet 
the expectations of the Third Circuit.223  
2.   Ninth Circuit 
Although a post-hoc assessment of Georgia’s progress toward 
deinstitutionalization is not enough to satisfy the Third Circuit’s 
definition of an effectively working plan, it might be enough to 
satisfy the Ninth Circuit if the state can demonstrate that it has (1) 
made significant progress in moving people out of institutions, (2) 
increased its budget for community services in spite of fiscal 
constraints, and (3) increased the size of its HCBS programs over 
time by applying for more Medicaid waivers.224  
Between 2001 and 2008, Georgia transitioned 643 individuals with 
developmental disabilities out of institutions.225 This is a 41% 
reduction in the number of persons with MR/DD who are confined in 
institutions.226 Additionally, Georgia has reduced the mental illness 
institutional population by 368 individuals, which is a 39% change.227 
In Sanchez, the court found that California decreased its institutional 
population by 20% in four years.228 Similarly, in Arc of Washington 
State, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that Washington decreased its 
institutional population by 20%.229 As in Sanchez and Arc of 
Washington State, Inc., the Ninth Circuit would likely consider 
Georgia’s decrease of 39% or 40% in the institutional population to 
be an indication that the state has an effectively working plan. 
Between 2001 and 2006, Georgia increased its spending on HCBS 
waiver programs by 125% and increased spending on waivers for 
individuals with MR/DD by 188.8%, while spending on institutions 
for people with MR/DD remained constant over the same time 
                                                                                                                 
 223. Compliance Agreement, supra note 142, art. I, § IV(A). 
 224. Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. 
Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 620–22 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 225. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See supra text accompanying note 176. 
 228. Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1067. 
 229. Arc of Wash. State, 427 F.3d at 621–22. 
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period.230 In Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit found that California 
increased spending on community services by 196% over 10 years.231 
The court similarly found, in Arc of Washington State, Inc., that 
Washington had increased its annual budget for community-based 
disability programs by 109.5% over 7 years.232 Just as the Ninth 
Circuit found that a spending increase of 196% over ten years and 
109.5% over seven years for community-based services was evidence 
that the state had an effectively working plan, Georgia’s increase of 
125% over five years would probably indicate that it has an 
effectively working plan. 
The State’s past progress in moving people out of institutions, 
expanding its waiver program, and increasing spending on 
community-based services may be adequate to meet the Ninth 
Circuit’s requirements for an effectively working plan. However, the 
state must be careful that it does not allow fiscal constraints to 
impede its progress in the future. One of the factors that the Ninth 
Circuit considered when reviewing the Olmstead plan in Arc of 
Washington State, Inc. was evidence that the state had increased 
spending on community-based services while other agencies were 
dealing with cutbacks.233 Georgia has failed to meet its goals for 
increasing MRWP waivers in FY 2007, 2008, and 2009 under the 
multi-year funding plan.234 The state has also fallen short of meeting 
its goals for increasing ICWP waivers under the multi-year funding 
plan and the Money Follows the Person grant for several years.235 
Although the state is complying with the Money Follows the Person 
Grant with respect to moving individuals with MR/DD out of 
institutions, its overall commitment to funding community-based 
services has been scaled back.236 If the state wants to persist in 
                                                                                                                 
 230. LIPSON, ET AL., supra note 68, at 8–9. 
 231. Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1067. 
 232. Arc of Wash. State, 427 F.3d at 621–22 (finding that the State had increased its annual budget for 
community-based disability programs from $167 million in 1994 to $350 million in 2001). 
 233. Arc of Wash. State, 427 F.3d at 621.  
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 184–89. 
 235. See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Blanchard E-mail II, supra note 188. 
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meeting the standards of the Ninth Circuit for having and effectively 
working plan, it must continue its progress despite fiscal constraints. 
CONCLUSION 
In Olmstead, the Supreme Court determined that the unnecessary 
institutionalization of a disabled person is a form of unlawful 
discrimination under the ADA.237 States are required to provide home 
and community-based services to people with disabilities when the 
states’ treatment professionals determine that community-based 
treatment is appropriate and the individuals do not object.238 
However, states only have to make reasonable modifications; they do 
not have to make modifications that will result in a fundamental 
alteration of their programs or services.239 According to Olmstead, a 
state can meet the reasonable modification standard by showing that 
it has a “comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing 
qualified individuals with mental disabilities in less restrictive 
settings, and a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace.”240  
The Olmstead Court did not explain what it means for a state to 
have an effectively working plan and a waiting list that moves at a 
reasonable pace, but the Ninth and Third Circuits have addressed the 
question.241 The Ninth Circuit looks at a state’s progress in moving 
people out of institutions, expanding their HCBS waiver programs, 
and increasing funding for community-based services in spite of 
fiscal constraints.242 The Third Circuit, however, says that a state’s 
past progress is not enough to prove that it has an effectively working 
plan.243 Rather, the Third Circuit requires that a state’s plan contain 
specific and measurable goals for which it can be held accountable.244  
                                                                                                                 
 237. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). See supra Part I (discussing the Olmstead decision). 
 238. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597. 
 239. Id. at 603. 
 240. Id. at 605–06.  
 241. See supra Parts I–II. 
 242. See supra Part II.A. 
 243. See supra Part II.B. 
 244. Id. 
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Georgia has failed to implement an effectively working plan as 
defined by the Third Circuit.245 However, the state may meet the 
standards of the Third Circuit by complying with the Olmstead 
settlement agreement.246 Under that agreement, the state must 
develop a plan that contains “an annual schedule of anticipated 
discharges” for institutionalized individuals who are capable and 
desirous of receiving treatment in the community and specifies how 
the state will “obtain and/or maintain necessary community services 
for those at risk for institutionalization.”247  
Georgia’s past progress in moving people out of institutions, 
expanding its waiver programs, and increasing spending on 
community-based services may satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s 
requirements for an effectively working plan.248 However, the state 
must continue its progress in order to comply with the Ninth Circuit’s 
standards in the future.249  Specifically, the state must continue 
moving people out of institutions, expanding its waiver programs, 
and increasing its spending on community-based services despite 
difficult economic times.250 
Amy Tidwell 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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